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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all parties to the 
proceeding in the district court. 
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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH 
CODE ANN.( 1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The plaintiff, Ann Benzaquen, was injured in an auto-pedestrian accident as 
a result of the alleged negligence of defendants TSl Partnership Limited Partnership, TS2 
Partnership Limited Partnership, TS3 Partnership Limited Partnership, M.S. Management 
Associates, Inc., Simon DeBartolo Group, Inc. and Simon Management Company, Inc. 
(collectively referred to herein as "defendants"). Defendants were the owners and 
managers of the Trolley Square mall in Salt Lake City and provided parking for mall 
patrons across a busy street from Trolley Square. Plaintiff asserts that defendants failed 
to take adequate measures to provide safe ingress and egress to Trolley Square despite 
knowledge of the lack of adequate on-site parking, and the safety hazards associated with 
providing parking across the street from the mall. Plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle 
as she crossed the street from Trolley Square at mid-block to return to her car which was 
parked in the off-site parking facility provided by Trolley Square. Defendants claimed 
that they did not breach any duty owed to plaintiff. The trial court agreed and granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint. Did the trial 
court err in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
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defendants owed plaintiff a duty either to provide adequate parking onsite, or to take 
reasonable measures to warn or guard invitees from the hazards presented by the offsite 
parking provided by defendants? 
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for summary judgment raises only 
legal issues, which this court reviews for correctness. E.g., Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 
(Utah 1991). This court does not defer to the trial court's conclusion "that facts are 
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein 
& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 
1996). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views the facts and all 
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
(here, the plaintiff). Id; J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Int% Inc., 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 
2000) (citations omitted). The court will affirm '"only if the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.'" Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289 
(citation omitted). u[D]oubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue 
of material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to trial." 
Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 107 (Utah 1992). 
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 34-
38), the memoranda and other papers filed by the parties in support of and in opposition 
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to defendants' motion (R. 46-52, 148-158, 261-270), and at the hearing on the motion. 
(R. 326.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the issue and provides as 
follows: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Summary judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion [for summary 
judgment], memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries. The plaintiff, Ann Benzaquen, 
brought this action against TSl Partnership Limited Partnership, TS2 Partnership Limited 
Partnership, TS3 Partnership Limited Partnership, M.S. Management Associates, Inc., 
Simon DeBartolo Group, Inc. and Simon Management Company, Inc. (collectively 
referred to herein as "defendants") asserting that their negligence in failing to provide 
safe ingress and egress to commercial property to which plaintiff was an invitee was a 
proximate result of her injuries. (R. 165-212.) 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they did not breach 
any duty owed to plaintiff. (R. 34-38.) After a hearing, the trial court granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. 146-147.) The trial court entered a 
written order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 282-284), as 
well as written findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 285-291.) This appeal 
followed.1 
defendant Salt Lake City Corporation was never served with the Complaint and is 
not a party to this appeal. By an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant Mark 
Molzen, Defendant Mark Molzen was dismissed from the action and is not a party to this 
appeal. (R308-10). 
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B. Statement of Facts 
At all times relevant to this case, the Green Street Social Club (uGreen Street") 
was located at the Trolley Square mall in Salt Lake City. (R. 170.) Trolley Square was 
owned and/or managed by defendants TS1 Partnership Limited Partnership, TS2 
Partnership Limited Partnership, TS3 Partnership Limited Partnership, M.S. Management 
Associates, Inc., Simon DeBartolo Group, Inc. and Simon Management Company, Inc. 
(collectively referred to herein as "Defendants"). (R. 165.) 
Trolley Square is a shopping center bounded on the south by 600 South Street, on 
the east by 700 East Street, on the north by 500 South Street and on the west by 600 East 
Street. (R. 171.) 
The defendants provide parking for tenants and patrons on Trolley Square's 
premises. (R. 326, P. 6.) However, the parking available on Trolley Square premises is 
not adequate for the needs of all of Trolley Square's patrons. (R. 169.) To provide 
additional parking, defendants leased a parking structure located across the street from 
Trolley Square on the north side of 500 South Street. The parking structure is in the 
middle of the block, across 500 South from the entrance to Green Street. (R. 326, P. 4.) 
There was a sign on the parking structure that was posted in the evenings which stated, 
"Trolley Square Parking Here." (R. 171.) 
Moreover, in front of the only entrance to Green Street, there was a cobblestone 
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brick strip that had the look of an entrance to a cross-walk and appeared to channel 
pedestrians from the sidewalk into the street. (R. 168.) In addition, a few feet to the east 
was a bright yellow Pedestrians Crossing sign, similar to signs identifying a crosswalk. 
(R. 172.) 
On the evening of December 13, 1996, plaintiff, Ann Benzaquen, attended a 
holiday party at Green Street. (R. 326, P. 8.) When plaintiff initially arrived at Trolley 
Square she attempted to park her vehicle on-site. (R. 239.) Plaintiff drove through the 
Trolley Square parking lot, but due to defendants' failure to provide adequate parking on-
site, there were no available parking spaces. (R. 239.) Plaintiff then drove her car out 
onto 500 South Street, where she saw the sign indicating parking for Trolley Square on 
the north side. (R. 239.) Due to the limited availability of parking, plaintiff resorted to 
parking on the north side of 500 South Street and then proceeded to Green Street. (R. 
239.) 
Plaintiff attended a social function at Green Street for approximately two and a 
half hours prior to the accident. (R. 167.) Plaintiff did not consume any alcohol the 
night of the incident, nor does she ever consume alcoholic beverages. (R. 167.) When she 
exited Green Street, she walked across the cobblestone brick walkway in front of the 
entrance to Green Street and crossed 500 South to get to the parking structure on the north 
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side. (R. 326, P. 2.) As plaintiff crossed the street, she was struck by a westbound car. 
(R. 167.) 
The plaintiff, like many other patrons, elected to cross 500 South at mid-block. (R. 
244.) In fact, in order to avoid crossing the street at mid-block, a patron was required to 
walk a relatively long distance to get to either corner, then cross the street and come back. 
(R. 326, P. 14.) In addition, there was construction on 500 South Street the evening of 
the accident, but additional discovery is required in order to ascertain the extent of the 
obstruction. (R 244). At this point, the only discovery that has been completed is the 
plaintiffs deposition and the documents provided by Trolley Square. (R. 170.) 
Defendants admit that "Trolley Square is maintained at less than what would be 
considered 'optimal standards' in a typical mall," and defendants' history has been to pay 
insufficient attention to parking on site, allowing existing lots to fall into disrepair and 
into conditions of lowered safety for patrons. (R. 188, 190.) Defendants have a history of 
simultaneously informing the City of Salt Lake Planning and Zoning Department that 
Trolley Square has "surplus parking spaces," while internally admitting that customers 
perceive parking as a problem and are reluctant to go to Trolley Square "due to the 
difficult parking provided." (R. 195.) 
Defendants answered "No" to plaintiffs Interrogatory No. 10, which asked 
whether defendants had ever considered measures to increase the safety of patrons 
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entering Trolley Square from the 600 South side, even though the documents produced by 
defendants herein are replete with correspondence indicating that such concerns were 
known to defendants and were constantly being considered. (R. 170.) 
At the time of the subject accident, defendants had long been aware that Trolley 
Square had insufficient on-site parking for its customers. Patrons of Green Street 
frequently were unable to find on-site parking and parked across the street in the parking 
facility acquired for that purpose. Defendants also knew that patrons of Green Street and 
other businesses at the north end of Trolley Square mall frequently crossed the street at 
mid block because of the extremely long distances required to reach crosswalks at 600 
East or 700 East. (R. 170-171.) 
One of the documents provided by the defendants is a memo dated February 2nd, 
1994, from Les Kinsey to the Defendant's company. (R. 200.) The subject of the letter is 
the 1994 Trolley Square parking expansion project. In the memo Mr. Kinsey provides, 
"The mayor and other city officials recognize our desperate parking problem." (R. 200.) 
Further, the parking problem was at its worst during the Christmas holiday season, the 
time of the plaintiffs accident. (R. 326, P. 11.) 
The defendants had alternative options to remedy the parking problem. (R. 326, P. 
11-12.) They could have expanded the parking on-site to facilitate safe ingress and egress 
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to their facility. (R. 197.) Defendants could have provided adequate parking on-site for 
the number of anticipated tenants. (R. 197.) 
Alternatively, defendants could have increased parking capacity in the south 
parking lot (located across 600 South Street from Trolley Square) where they had 
previously erected a crosswalk, amber flashing lights and a walkway over the road. (R. 
326, P. 12.) There are memos in the record that indicate there were proposals to add 
parking on the south lot. (R. 197.) Instead, defendants elected to simply go off-site to the 
north where there were no precautions in place for safe pedestrian ingress and egress. (R. 
197.) The defendants then advertised the off-site parking by placing a large banner, that 
was only posted at nighttime, across from a bar on a tremendously busy street. (R. 326, P. 
12-13.) 
In 1992, prior to the construction of the overhead walkway which provided safe 
access over 600 South to the south parking lot, defendants stated in a letter, "In the past 
year I have received many complaints on the hazard of using the crosswalk from Trolley 
Square south parking lot across 600 South Street to Trolley Square. In fact, I have 
witnessed several incidents where people crossing in the crosswalk were nearly struck by 
vehicles. We recently had a pregnant woman struck by a car in the cross walk." (R. 200.) 
Defendants concluded the letter by saying, "Also, it's difficult enough for customers to 
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find a parking spot at Trolley Square. We would rather not have them risk life or limb to 
get inside." (R. 200.) 
There is evidence in the record that indicates that the defendants knew or should 
have known that pedestrians would cross at mid-block on 500 South Street. For example, 
plaintiff testified that, " . . . there was not a crosswalk, per se, but everybody that was 
going to Green Street, was coming across the street the same way and it was in the middle 
of the block." (R. 168.) Plaintiff testified further, ^People were crossing both ways from 
Green Street to the parking garage and from the garage back to Green Street." (R. 168.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants owed a 
duty to provide adequate onsite parking, or to protect patrons from the foreseeable 
hazards presented by off-site parking. Under Utah law, and general common law 
principles, a duty arises to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others if such danger 
is foreseeable. Moreover, courts have held that the duty of reasonable care imposed on 
landowners does not end at their property line. Instead, the duty of reasonable care 
extends to those injuries that are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conditions 
on the landowner's property. In this case, the defendants had knowledge of the dangers 
that the lack of on-site parking at Trolley Square posed to its patrons. The defendants had 
several complaints from patrons concerning the inadequacy of its parking and had reports 
of patrons being hit by cars as they crossed the street to or from Trolley Square. As such, 
this Court should find that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because 
the evidence was sufficient to show that defendants had a duty of reasonable care beyond 
its property line because of the conditions that existed on its own property. 
II. The defendants relied heavily on the theory that a duty does not arise when 
a danger is open and obvious. However, the Utah courts have held that the open and 
obvious rule is no longer applicable because it is incompatible with Utah's comparative 
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negligence scheme. Under Utah law, the issue of openness and obviousness of a danger 
is a question for a jury to determine in apportioning of fault. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS' KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPLICABLE 
HAZARDS GAVE RISE TO A DUTY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ON-SITE 
PARKING, OR TO TAKE PROPER MEASURE TO PROVIDE SAFE 
INGRESS AND EGRESS FROM OFFSITE PARKING 
The Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment because 
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants owed a duty to 
provide adequate onsite parking, or to protect patrons from the foreseeable hazards 
presented by off-site parking. 
Defendants' knowledge of the hazards inherent in crossing busy city streets to 
access the Trolley Square shopping mall imposed a duty on defendants to maintain their 
premises in such a manner as to reduce such risks to their invitees. Under Utah law and 
general common law principles, "a duty arises to exercise reasonable care for the safety of 
others . . . if such danger is foreseeable." Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury Inc., 909 
P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah 1996). Several courts have concluded that "when the activities 
conducted on the business premises affect the risk of injury off-premises, the landowner 
may have an obligation 4to correct the condition or guard against foreseeable injuries."' 
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Stephens v. Bashas, Inc., 924 P.2d 117, 121 (Ariz.App.Div. 1 1986) quoting Ember v. 
B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind.App. 1986). Therefore, the defendants' 
knowledge of foreseeable injuries to their patrons gave rise to a duty either to provide 
adequate onsite parking, or to protect invitees, like the plaintiff, from the hazards created 
by the off-site parking provided by the defendants. 
In Stephens v. Bashas, Inc., 924 P.2d 117 (Ariz.App.Div. 1 1986), the evidence 
indicated that delivery truck drivers, such as the plaintiff in that case, routinely parked 
their trucks in the middle of the street due to a lack of adequate space on the defendant's 
property. The plaintiff was struck by a vehicle as he attempted to return to his truck 
which was parked in the middle of the street. The court stated: 
When the activities conducted on the business 
premises affect the risk of injury off-premises, the 
landowner may have an obligation "to correct the 
condition or guard against foreseeable injuries." 
(Citations omitted.) This is particularly true when the 
activity involves use of the adjoining way to the 
business's commercial advantage. 
Id. at 121. The court went on to reverse summary judgment for the defendant because the 
defendant "had an affirmative duty to use reasonable care in conducting its business and 
maintaining its premises to avoid causing injury to [plaintiff]." Id. The court further 
stated that "this duty includes an obligation 'to provide reasonably safe means of ingress 
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and egress.'" Id at 120 citing O'Reilly Motor Co. v. Rich, 411 P.2d 194, 199 (Ariz. 
1966).2 
In Alcaraz v. Vece, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 448, 929 P.2d 1239 (Cal. 1997), the court 
rejected the argument that the defendant could not possible be at fault for the plaintiffs 
injury which occurred on a city-owned road which adjoined the defendant's premises. 
could not possibly be the fault.. In Alcaraz, the plaintiff had injured himself on this 
adjoining road by stepping on a broken water meter box, a box that was on property that 
the landowner defendant did not own. In denying the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, the court stated that: 
The issue in the case before us is not whether the 
defendants had a duty to discover a dangerous 
condition on property they did not own. Plaintiff in the 
2
 The reasoning applied by the Stephens court forms the core of plaintiff s 
claim in this case, and is based on THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343A which 
provides that: 
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for 
physical harm caused to them by any activities or 
conditions on the land whose danger is known or 
obvious to them, unless the possessor should 
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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present case alleged that defendants had received 
actual notice of the defective condition of the meter 
box. The issue, therefore, is not whether defendant had 
a duty to inspect or repair the meter box, but whether, 
in light of their alleged knowledge of the dangerous 
condition of the meter box, they had a duty to persons 
entering the strip of land to protect them from, or warn 
them of, the hazard. 
Id. at 1243-44. The court held that "a possessor of land who knows of the hazard would 
have a duty to erect a barrier or warn persons entering the land of the danger, whether or 
not the possessor of the land has the authority to eliminate the hazard." Id. at 1243. 
In this case, as in the preceding cases, the defendants had knowledge of the 
hazards and risks that existed outside of their property lines due to the conditions within 
their property lines. Approximately four years prior to the accident involved in this case, 
an internal memo from defendants stated, "In the last year I have received many 
complaints on the hazards of using the crosswalk from Trolley Square south parking lot 
across 600 South Street to Trolley Square. In fact, I have witnessed several incidents 
where people crossing in the crosswalk were nearly struck by vehicles. We recently had a 
pregnant woman struck by a car in the crosswalk." (R. 200.) He goes on to state that 'It's 
difficult enough for customers to find a parking spot at Trolley Square. We would rather 
not have them risk life or limb to get inside." (R.200.) Moreover, defendants admit that 
"Trolley Square is maintained at less than what is would be considered 'optimal 
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standards' in a typical mall," and it has been defendants' history to pay minimal attention 
to parking. (R. 188, 190.) Therefore, it is evident that defendants had knowledge of their 
inadequacies as to on-site parking and the foreseeable injuries and risks that these 
inadequacies presented. 
In another similar case, a land-owner of a mobile home park refused to erect a 
fence between the tenant's lot and a major street with a speed limit of 45 miles per hour. 
Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1057-58 (Ariz. App. 1989). However, two of the 
three other lots that bordered the busy street were fenced. While the tenants' children 
were playing on their lot, their ball rolled into the street, and their child was struck by an 
oncoming motorist as the child chased after the ball. The landlord argued that he had no 
duty to a tenant with respect to dangers outside the leased premises. The court held that 
"harm that is caused, in whole or in part, by an activity or condition on a particular 
premises cannot be viewed as unforeseeable as a matter of law merely because it happens 
to manifest itself beyond the property line." Id. at 1059. See also Langen v. Rushton, 360 
N.W.2d 270, 273 (Mich.App. 1984) ("Where the parking lot of a shopping center abuts a 
public highway, it is entirely foreseeable that a serious accident may occur between a 
customer entering or exiting from the parking lot and a highway motorist."). 
As in the cases cited above, the defendants in this case knew that they exposed 
their patrons to substantial risks by providing inadequate parking. However, rather than 
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fixing the problem and alleviating the risks to its patrons, defendants chose an alternative 
that increased the risk of harm to its invitees. Rather than build more parking on-site or to 
the south, where an overhead crosswalk already existed, defendants leased a parking 
structure north of their facility. The cobblestone strip in front of Green Street from which 
plaintiff entered the street led patrons from the sidewalk into 500 South towards the 
leased parking structure. Moreover, a cross-walk sign to the east of the cobblestone 
entrance to the street furthered the impression that it was appropriate to cross 500 South 
at mid-block to access the offsite parking. Finally, defendants were acutely aware of the 
dangers associated with placing parking lots across the street from Trolley Square based 
on their experience on the 600 South side of the mall. Under these circumstances, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that defendants should have taken measures to warn or 
guard patrons from the hazards presented by offsite parking. Thus, the Court should find, 
as did the courts in Stephens, Udy, mdAlcaraz, that when the defendants had knowledge 
that the conditions on their business premises increased the risk of injury off-premises, 
the defendants had a duty to guard against any foreseeable injuries resulting from these 
conditions. 
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE REGARDLESS OF 
WHETHER THE HAZARD TO PLAINTIFF WAS OPEN OR OBVIOUS 
Utah appellate courts have unequivocally held that the open and obvious hazard 
rule is no longer an absolute bar to recovery because it is incompatible with Utah's 
comparative negligence scheme. Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 1989). 
Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate regardless of whether the hazard to plaintiff 
was open or obvious. 
The plaintiff in Donahue contacted a power line while installing a rain gutter. The 
district court concluded that the defendant had no duty to warn or protect individuals from 
the power line because it was an open and obvious danger. The Utah Court of Appeals 
disagreed and held that "the adoption of a comparative negligence system amounts to an 
expression by the Legislature that the harsh and inflexible result of total victory or 
unconditional defeat compelled by the traditional contributory negligence system, 
including the open and obvious danger rule, is no longer acceptable." Id. at 1279. The 
Court further stated that "the open and obvious danger rule is fundamentally incompatible 
with a comparative negligence scheme, which requires the finder of fact to allocate 
liability for an injury based on the relative responsibility of the parties involved." Id. 
Thus, whether or not plaintiff was at fault in this case due to the open or obvious nature 
of the hazard must be determined by the jury, and summary judgment should be reversed. 
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Similarly, in Guerrero v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp., 6 P.3d 250 (Alaska 
2000), the court rejected the argument that the defendant premises owner had no duty to 
warn the plaintiff of the hazards of jaywalking. As with the issue of an open and obvious 
hazard, the court held that any fault to be placed on the plaintiff due to jaywalking was to 
be determined by the jury and was not an absolute defense: 
Defendant does not deny that it generally owes a duty 
of care to pedestrians who lawfully cross its roadways; 
it maintains only that this duty somehow vanished 
under the particular facts of this case because the 
crossing alleged in the complaint was unlawful. Yet, 
just as [defendant's] general duty of due care toward 
motorists does not hinge on a particular driver's misuse 
of the highways, neither can its general duty toward 
pedestrians who cross public roadways turn on the 
particularized facts of each case. Thus, even if. .. 
plaintiff "darted" onto the street, or "jaywalked," or 
otherwise violated City or State regulations attempting 
to cross [the street], this conduct could not absolve 
[defendant] of the duty it owed him; rather, his conduct 
would bear on the jury's determination of negligence, 
breach, causation, and damages. 
Id at 255. Thus, whether or not plaintiff "jaywalked" while crossing the street at the time 
of the accident is irrelevant to the determination of whether summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that defendants knew Trolley Square had 
inadequate parking, and that there were serious safety hazards inherent in the provision of 
offsite parking, to trigger a duty to take measures to protect the safety of patrons such as 
plaintiff. The Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case 
to the trial court. 
DATED this 12th day of August, 2002. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
Jeffrey1 D. Eisenberg 
Attorneys for Appellant 
a 
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I hereby certify that on this 12th day of August, 2002,1 caused to be served by 
U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing on: 
Robert L. Stevens, Esq. 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
QtMk-
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ROBERT L. STEVENS [3105] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants Simon Debartolo Group, Inc.; 
and Simon Management Company, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN BENZAQUEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TSl PARTNERSHIP LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; TS2 PARTNERSHIP 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; TS3 
PARTNERSHIP LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
M.S. MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; 
SIMON DEBARTOLO GROUP, INC.; a 
corporation; SIMON MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, INC., s corporation; SALT 
LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a municipal 
corporation; and MARK MOLZEN, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 980911025 
Judge Frank Noel 
The Motion for Summary Judgement filed by defendants TSl Partnership Limited 
Partnership, TS2 Partnership Limited Partnership, TS3 Partnership Limited Partnership, M.S. 
Management Associates, Inc., Simon DeBartolo Group, Inc., and Simon Management Company, 
FILED DISfMcTCOURT 
Deputy Clerk 
PILEOBISTHiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SE? 2 4 2001 
Mi LAKfc COUNTY 
Deputy aerfT 
Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Simon defendants") came on for hearing pursuant 
to notice July 31, 2001. Plaintiff, the Simon defendants, and defendant Mark Molzen were each 
represented by their attorneys of record. 
The Court having made its ruling from the bench, and having entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, nowr enters its Order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgement submitted 
by the Simon defendants is granted. Plaintiffs Complaint as against all defendants, with the 
exception of Mark Molzen and Salt Lake City Corporation, is hereby dismissed. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this / ^ ? day of August, 2001, to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
David A. Curt 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Molzen 
369606 
14288-0001 
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- \ evVJ 
FILED OiSTHI^T "flURT 
Third Juo':c'f *ct 
ROBERT L. STEVENS [3105] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants Simon Debartolo Group, Inc.; 
and Simon Management Company, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN BENZAQUEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TSl PARTNERSHIP LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; TS2 PARTNERSHIP 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; TS3 
PARTNERSHIP LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
M.S. MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; 
SIMON DEBARTOLO GROUP, INC.; a 
corporation; SIMON MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, INC., s corporation; SALT 
LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a municipal 
corporation; and MARK MOLZEN, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON THE 
SIMON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 980911025 
Judge Frank Noel 
The Motion for Summary Judgement filed by defendants TSl Partnership Limited 
Partnership, TS2 Partnership Limited Partnership, TS3 Partnership Limited Partnership, M.S. 
Management Associates, Inc., Simon DeBartolo Group, Inc., and Simon Management Company, 
Jt$ 
SEP 2 *, 2001 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Simon defendants") came on for hearing pursuant 
to notice July 31, 2001. Plaintiff, the Simon defendants, and defendant Mark Molzen were each 
represented by their attorneys of record. 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having ruled from the 
bench, now enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was injured in an auto/pedestrian accident on December 13,1996 
as she walked from the Green Street social club at Trolley Square in Salt Lake City to her car. 
Plaintiff had parked in a parking structure owned by the Boyer Company which had been 
temporarily leased to the Simon defendants for the use of Trolley Square patrons after hours. 
The plaintiff walked diagonally across 500 South Street in a northeast direction. After she had 
crossed at least three traffic lanes, she was hit by a westbound car driving on 500 South. She 
never saw the car that hit her. 
2. There were traffic signals and crosswalks located at both the east comer of 
Trolley Square at 500 South and 700 East and at the west comer of Trolley Square at 500 South 
and 600 East. The plaintiff chose not to attempt to use either of those crosswalks but crossed in 
mid-block. A drawing of the accident scene is attached as Exhibit "A." It shows the diagonal 
route taken by plaintiff immediately prior to the accident. 
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3. The Simon defendants were the owners or managers of Trolley Square at 
the time of the accident. 
4. The Simon defendants had arranged for the availability of parking in the 
Boyer parking structure in order to make more parking available for their evening patrons. 
Parking lots owned by Simon defendants were sometimes crowded, even though Trolley Square 
complied with all Salt Lake City regulations regarding the availability of parking. 
5. By her Amended Complaint on file herein, plaintiff has alleged liability 
against the driver of the car that hit her, defendant Molzen. Defendant Molzen is not a party to 
this Motion. 
6. By her Amended Complaint herein, plaintiff has alleged liability against 
Salt Lake City for failure to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition and failure to make 
the street reasonably safe for pedestrians. Salt Lake City has never been served and is not a party 
to this Motion. 
7. By her Amended Complaint, the plaintiff has alleged negligence on the 
part of the Simon defendanxs alleging a failure to warn against jay walking, a failure to erect a 
barricade to prevent jay walking, generalized negligence in providing available parking which 
required patrons to cross 500 South and a failure to request that Salt Lake City construct a traffic 
walk or other signal for persons crossing 500 South in the middle of the block. In her responsive 
3 
Memorandum, plaintiff withdrew any claim against the Simon defendants relating to requesting 
Salt Lake City to construct a mid-block crosswalk. 
8. Near the area where plaintiff began crossing the street, there is a sign 
erected by Salt Lake City which depicts children walking. It is a school crossing sign which 
alerts motorists to the school crosswalk at 700 East. 
9. Plaintiff has identified several locations, including the location outside the 
entrance to the Green Street Club at which brick pavers provided a walkway between the 
sidewalk and the curb on the south side of 500 South. Plaintiff testified that she walked on those 
pavers before entering the street. 
10. The plaintiff testified that she observed several other people jay walking 
when she parked her car and came to Trolley Square and when she left Trolley Square. 
11. If plaintiff had chosen to cross in a marked crosswalk, it would have been 
necessary for her to walk further in order to get to one of the corners of the block and use the 
crosswalk. 
12. Trolley Square owns a parking lot which is on the south side of 600 South. 
There is a crosswalk in mid-block from that parking lot to Trolley Square. There is also an 
overhead pedestrian bridge at that location. 
4 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff was acting in violation of Utah statutory law Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-79(3) by crossing a street between adjacent intersections at which traffic signals are in 
operation. 
2. The Simon defendants had no general or specific duty to plaintiff to 
restrain and prevent her from jay walking. 
3. The Simon defendants had no general or specific duty to warn plaintiff 
about the dangers of jay walking or to erect a fence or barrier to prevent the possibility of jay 
walking. 
4. The Simon defendants had no duty to provide parking to Trolley Square 
patrons which did not require them cross a city street. 
a DATED this ^ < If day of ^wfOst, 2001 
JUDGE F 
Third Judici; 
369591 
14288-0001 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true andporrect copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this /y day of August, 2001, to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
David A. Cutt 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
900 Parkside Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Molzen 
369591 
14288-0001 
6 
EXHIBIT 
A 
A 
I vo 
I 
LI" 
E--^ie.DTnTnTU!Trji"irJ 
nmni!t'!"Mi'innH!i'iii 
i lM l l l l i iM i lU l l l l l l l i i i f i i l l ' 3 
i l ' l l l i i l l i ' J ' i i ' - iM 'H i i i ' i i i i r j I— 
(JUI I i i l l l im 'H. : l l l . i i ; ! . l ! iU |3 j 
JI 
l i : H*f 
i J 
rac 
i : *"- • f • 11 • ! « 
imDCD 
uv't mi l l ! ' 
jn " •b in Willi 
mi l ium 
'*,• 
_ j * 0 i i 
•Lkllilli II 
inrrmrTi f-f 
litrffn C 
JCL 
Df 
m 
[ 4 ^ 1 i^iiimiiii 
-! lilHUihi 
3V, .,„„ ^ ™ . v 
